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The aid allocation literature explores the motives behind development aid assistance. This 
literature is enormous, yet surprisingly, the extant empirical studies have in the main only 
focused on the motives of established donors. Consequently, relatively little is known of the 
motives of new donors. This paper explores the aid allocation motives of three relatively new 
DAC donors: Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Both OLS and Tobit two-way effects 
estimators  are used  to model their  aid allocation process.  The results indicate that 
humanitarian concerns are not an important factor for these three donors. Greece contributes 
aid predominately to its neighbors and to transitional East European nations. Portugal is 
motivated by commercial interests and former colony status. The bandwagon effect exists in 
reverse for Portugal. Commercial interests operate also for Luxembourg.  Additionally, 
Luxembourg appears to donate to smaller more developed countries and is less inclined to 
donate to East European nations. 
 
Keywords:  foreign aid allocation, bilateral aid, economic development, humanitarian 
concerns   
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1.  Introduction 
 
For the past 40 years, development aid assistance has been an important feature of 
international relations, especially programs designed to alleviate global poverty and assist 
with economic development. In the 2000-2006 period, Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) countries alone donated $420 billion US dollars (in 2006 USD) to some 190 countries 
(OECD.Stat DAC2a, 2008).  Given the magnitude of the resources involved, it is 
understandable that both the effects of development aid and the criteria upon which aid is 
allocated have attracted a great deal of interest. According to Doucouliagos, Paldam, and 
Christensen (2007), the Aid Allocation Literature consists of 166 academic empirical papers. 
These papers cover a range of models, donor countries, recipients, and time periods. One 
interesting and rather surprising feature of this literature is that it has largely ignored the role 
of new donors. For example, relatively little is known about the aid allocation process among 
comparatively new DAC donor countries, such as Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal, and 
little is known about new non-DAC donor countries, such as Kuwait, Israel, Saudi Arabia, 
and China.
1
Analysis of aid allocation is an important complement to the aid effectiveness 
literature. Recent reviews have cast doubts about the effectiveness of official development 
assistance in meeting its primary goals of generating growth and alleviating poverty (see, for 
example, Doucouliagos and Paldam 2006, 2008, and 2009).
 Those studies that have investigated specific donor countries have focused on 
established donors, such as the UK, the US, Australia,  and Scandinavian countries. The 
principal aim of this paper is to identify some of the motives of the newer DAC donors for 
donating development aid. 
2
                                                 
1 Typically, aid from these countries is included in cross-sectional or panel data analysis. The two exceptions are 
Alesina and Wedder (2002) and Neumayer (2003), who each report a separate estimate for Portugal. Neumayer 
also provides one estimate for Luxembourg.  
 One reason for the failure of 
development aid might be the motive for allocating aid. For example, if aid is allocated to 
meet recipient country development needs, then the aid ineffectiveness result would be a sad 
indictment on the ability of donors to make their contributions work. However, if aid is 
allocated predominantly for non-development reasons, then the failure to alleviate poverty 
might be an incidental outcome. 
2 These reviews find that aid has had positive specific regional effects, but not across developing countries on 
average.   3 
Renewed international focus on extreme poverty and hunger culminated in the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly in September 2000 (UN, 
2000). This declaration provides clear aims and goals associated with poverty reduction.  It 
would therefore be reasonable to expect that development aid would be allocated with 
poverty reduction as its primary goal, and that donor countries would focus their aid 
programs on the poorest of the world’s countries.  
Testing for donor motives indicates whether stated intentions are met by actual action, 
and provides an indication of the political will of the donor to tackle poverty in developing 
countries and meet the Millennium goals. Donor countries with established aid programs 
have a history of aid allocation in line with motives that range from poverty reduction, 
through perceived obligations to old colonies and other historic ties, to military and strategic 
interests. This paper examines whether countries that have commenced  donating 
development aid relatively  recently have the same old motives of strategic interests and 
historical ties, or are motivated more by real poverty reduction, in line with increasing and 
renewed international interest in this “genuine” and humanitarian motive.  
The three new donors analyzed in this paper provide an interesting contrast. Both 
Greece and Portugal are relatively newly industrialized nations. Portugal has former colonies 
that might influence aid allocations, while Greece has several neighbors whose level of 
comparative development might affect her aid allocation. Luzembourg is an established 
developed nation surrounded by developed neighbours. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the motives for 
allocating aid. A brief discussion on each of the new donor countries is presented in section 3. 
The analytical approach is presented in section 4, while section 5 discusses the data. Section 




2.  Donor motives 
Numerous studies have examined the motives behind aid allocations for established donors 
(for a comprehensive list of studies see Doucouliagos, Paldam, and Christensen, 2007). 
Researchers have explored several allocation criteria. The most obvious motive is 
recipient/humanitarian need. This is typically proxied by income per capita (usually GNP) of 
the recipient country. Some studies (Neumayer, 2003 and Gounder, 1995) also use the 
Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), or life expectancy (Tarp et al, 1999) to supplement   4 
the income measure as an indication of the level of poverty in a recipient country. Population 
size is also used frequently as a measure of need: a larger poorer country might be deemed to 
be more deserving than a smaller one.  
Most studies include some measure of commercial ties and interests, such as exports 
to the recipient country (Tarp et al, 1999, Gounder, 1995 and McGillivray and Oczkowski, 
1992). A third group of variables relates to ‘good behaviour’. This includes variables such as 
the degree of democracy (Alesina and Dollar, 2000 and Tarp et al, 1999), or some measure of 
human rights.  
The political and/or strategic interests of a country can be measured by colonial or 
Commonwealth status (Alesina and Dollar, 2000, Neumayer, 2003 and McGillivray and 
Oczkowski, 1992) or military aid/arms expenditure (Neumayer, 2003 and Gounder, 1995). 
Some studies (e.g. Tarp et al. 1999 and McGillivray and Oczkowski 1992) also include aid 
from other donor countries to measure the “bandwagon” effect (or the opposite).  
Alesina and Dollar (2000) examine the motives of a range of donor countries both in 
aggregate and individually. They find that smaller countries tend to receive more aid, as do 
more open countries (p.38). This result applies both in aggregate and for individual countries, 
though it is not nearly as significant as the colonial status of the recipient. More democratic 
countries also tend to receive more aid, though this result varies amongst individual donors.  
Significantly, colonial past is a major determinant of aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) 
find that colonial status (being a former or current colony) counts for significantly more than 
democracy and openness. For some donors it is also much more important than the income 
level of the recipient country.  Aid from France depends primarily on colonial status rather 
than income levels or good policy measures. Japanese aid seems to depend more on political 
alliances as determined by United Nations voting patterns (p.50).  
The Nordic countries tend to give more to poorer countries
3
The results for the U.S., Japan, and France are significant as they are three of the 
biggest donors of bilateral aid. Together with Germany, they account for 70% of bilateral aid 
[Alesina and Dollar, 2000]. Thus a significant amount of bilateral aid is not allocated 
primarily on the basis of need, but rather on colonial status and political alliances.  
, as does the United States 
of America. The U.S. however targets about a third of its aid  to its “special interest” 
countries, Israel and Egypt [Alesina and Dollar, 2000, p. 55]. 
                                                 
3 This is supported by Tarp et al. (1999), who find that “poor people in need” (p. 151) received more than 40% 
of Danish bilateral aid over the period of their study (1960 – 1995), though this was starting to trend downward 
towards the end of the period.   5 
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) examine British bilateral aid between 1980 and 
1987. Roughly 60% of British aid is distributed bilaterally. They find that per capita GNP 
was significant in allocating aid (and the amount of aid allocated), and that British aid seemed 
to be allocated generally in line with that of the DAC as a whole. They also find that there 
was a significant bias towards Commonwealth member nations – 78% of British bilateral aid 
goes to former British colonies. Commercial interests (represented by British exports to 
recipient countries) became more pronounced during the 1980s.  
Neumayer (2003) looks at the factors that determine multilateral aid allocations 
through four regional development banks (the African, Asian, Caribbean and Inter-American 
Development Bank) and three United Nations Agencies (United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations 
Regular Programme of Technical Assistance (UNTA).  
Neumayer finds that there is a bias towards less populous countries (as do Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000).  In addition, Neumayer finds that poorer countries receive more of this 
multilateral aid, and that countries with higher levels of political freedom also receive higher 
levels of aid than an equivalently poor country with less political freedom. 
Both recipient need and donor interest motives appear to apply to the allocation of 
bilateral aid by Australia [Gounder, 1995]. Gounder finds that both motives apply to varying 
degrees in different years (between 1986-87 to 1991-92).  
  Doucouliagos and Paldam (2007) have recently reviewed some of the aid allocation 
criteria through meta-analysis of 124 empirical studies. The authors assess the importance of 
recipient country size, and explore the existence of three effects: the poverty effect (recipient 
income has a negative effect on aid allocation); the middle-income effect (the aid-income 
curve is convex); and the population effect (population size has a negative effect on aid 
allocation). They find that there is indeed an income effect but no middle income bias in aid 
allocations. They also find that there exists a population bias: “Countries with larger 
populations receive larger amounts of aid, but not in proportion to their GDP: Aid as a 
percentage of GDP falls, the more populous a nation is.” (p. 25) 
   6 
3.  The new donors 
In this section we present a brief overview of development assistance provided by the three 
new donors. Table 1 lists all the DAC donors, together with their first year of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) contributions. 
 
Table 1: DAC donors and year of first ODA commitments 
Country  Year ODA commenced  Country  Year ODA commenced 
Australia  1965  Japan  1960 
Austria  1961 
Luxembourg  1990 
Belgium  1960  Netherlands  1960 
Canada  1960  New Zealand  1970 
Denmark  1960  Norway  1960 
Finland  1970 
Portugal  1987 
France  1960  Spain  1980 
Germany  1960  Sweden  1960 
Greece  1996  Switzerland  1960 
Ireland  1974  United Kingdom  1960 
Italy  1960  United States  1960 
Source: OECD.Stat DAC3a, 2008. Countries in bold are analyzed in the paper 
 
3.1  Greece 
Greece first became a net donor in 1996. Prior to that, Greece received ODA mainly from 
Britain, the USA, and West Germany (Pelt, 2006). The DAC conducted a peer review of 
Greece’s development aid in 2006 (OECD DAC, 2006a). The review found that:  
•  Aid from Greece has been concentrated in the Balkan and Black sea countries – these 
are neighboring countries to Greece that are in “post conflict situations and/or 
undergoing economic transition”. It is in Greece’s interests for these countries to 
become more stable politically and  economically. There is also stronger public 
awareness of and sympathy for Greek aid going to more immediate neighbors. 
•  The Balkan and Black Sea countries will  become ineligible for DAC aid in the 
medium term. Consequently, Greece has widened her list of recipient countries in the 
second 5 years of her aid program to include Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African 
countries, particularly since 2003, in line with the Millennium Development Goals.   
•  Greece will need to triple development aid in real terms to meet the European Union 
target of 0.51% of Gross National Income to ODA by 2010 (over USD$1billion). The   7 
report suggests that increased public awareness of development aid (despite wide 
support for humanitarian assistance) will be needed to support the shift in focus from 
immediate regions, as well as the large increase in aid needed to meet the EU 2010 
target.  
•  ODA disbursements in 2004 were USD$321million or 0.16% of Greek GNI; The 
DAC average was 0.26%. However Greece also hosted large numbers of Albanian 
secondary school students, at a cost of 0.07% of GNI. Greece is arguing to have this 
included in DAC estimates. 
•  More recently Greece has shown increasing humanitarian participation in the world 
community, particularly in her response to the 2004 Tsunami, the 2005 earthquake in 
Pakistan, and the 2006 Lebanon crisis.  
 
The DAC peer review report suggests early motives for the allocation of development aid 
for Greece were largely aligned with Greece’s self interests of stability and economic 
development in her own region, but more recently there is said to have been a shift to more 
humanitarian concerns. 
 
Table  2  lists the main recipients of Greek aid and the percentage of total net ODA 
disbursements received over the period 1996 - 2006.  
 
 
Table 2: Development Aid from Greece: Top 5 recipients, % shares 1996 - 2006 
Recipient 
Country 
% of total net ODA 
disbursements from Greece 
Serbia  26.00 
Albania  21.21 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  7.81 
FYROM-Macedonia  6.07 
Afghanistan  4.37 
Other (108 countries)  34.54 
Source: OECD.Stat DAC2A (2008) 
 
 
   8 
3.2  Luxembourg 
Luxembourg became a donor in 1990. Since that time,  ODA disbursements have 
increased substantially, growing in real terms by an average of 18% per annum from 1995-
96, to reach 0.82% of GNI in 2001 [OECD DAC, 2003]. By 2006, ODA was 0.89% of GNI 
in Luxembourg [OECD DAC, 2008b]. The 2003 DAC Peer Review of Luxembourg 
attributes this growth in Luxembourg’s ODA to strong public and political support in favor of 
ODA, as well as sustained economic growth [OECD DAC, 2003].  
Earlier DAC reviews (conducted in 1993 and 1998) identified the large number of 
recipient countries, with resulting difficulties in monitoring and assessing projects, as an issue 
to be addressed [OECD DAC, 1998]. In 1994 Luxembourg introduced a policy of targeting a 
small number of countries (14); by 2003 the target was reduced to 10. However a significant 
proportion of bilateral aid (25% in 2001, mainly co-financed with non-government 
organisations) goes to “project” countries; preventing increases in the dispersement of aid and 
increasing the proportion of ODA that goes to the target countries was a major 
recommendation of the 2003 review, along with increased monitoring for effectiveness in 
poverty reduction [OECD DAC, 2003]. 
Table 3 lists the main recipients of Luxembourg aid and the percentage of total net ODA 
disbursements received over the period 1990 - 2006. 
 
Table 3: Development Aid from Luxembourg: Top 5 recipients, % shares 1990 – 2006 
Recipient 
Country 
% of total net ODA 
disbursements from 
Luxembourg  
Cape Verde  9.02 
Nicaragua  5.71 
Viet Nam  5.50 
Burkina Faso  4.98 
Senegal  4.92 
Other (117 countries)  69.87 
Source: OECD.Stat DAC2A (2008) 
 
 
3.3  Portugal 
Portugal first became a net donor in 1987. Prior to that Portugal received ODA mainly 
from the USA in the post World War II period. Early Portuguese aid focused on former   9 
colonies, particularly Portuguese speaking African countries. The DAC Peer Review of 
Portuguese development aid conducted in 2001 suggests a primary motive for this was 
“maintaining Portuguese historical, linguistic and cultural ties” [OECD, DAC, 2001]. The 
report criticized Portugal for not targeting poverty sufficiently or effectively. It did however 
praise Portugal for her rapid response to the East Timor crisis in 1999; as a result of this crisis 
East Timor has become a major focus for Portuguese aid. 
In 1999 Portugal’s ODA was 0.26% of GNP. By 2005 this had actually fallen to 0.21% 
[OECD DAC, 2008]. The DAC’s latest peer review on Portugal was conducted in 2006. 
[OECD DAC, 2006b]. This review reported on (and welcomed) a number of changes taking 
place in Portugal’s ODA strategy, including a new supervisory and coordinating body for 
Portuguese aid. It also welcomed Portugal’s commitment to the Millennium Development 
Goals.  
However, the report also points to a need to respond to the fragility and conflict issues in 
the countries Portugal donates to. It highlights the need to strengthen the poverty focus of her 
ODA as well as increasing the emphasis on the needs of the recipient countries. For example, 
the report criticized Portugal for continuing to provide education to poor countries in the form 
of scholarships to study in Portugal (potentially contributing to the “brain drain” from these 
countries) rather than developing education strategies within the recipient country [OECD 
DAC, 2006b]. 
Thus for Portugal, as for Greece, the background is one of initially focusing on self 
interest, largely in the form of cultural ties, with a more recent shift towards humanitarian 
concerns. Both countries face significant difficulties in increasing their levels of ODA as a 
proportion of GNP in line with the Millennium Development Goals, as well as reorienting 
their programs towards an increased focus on poverty reduction. 
Table 4 lists the main recipients of Portuguese aid and the percentage of total net ODA 








   10 
Table 4: Development Aid from Portugal: Top 5 recipients, % shares 1987 – 2006 
Recipient 
Country 
% of total net ODA 
disbursements from Portugal 
Mozambique  30.08 
Angola  25.37 
Timor-Leste  11.32 
Cape Verde  11.19 
Guinea-Bissau  9.77 
Other (78 countries)  12.27 
Source: OECD.Stat DAC2A (2008) 
 
Figure 1 compares the aid contributions of the new donors (as a percentage of Gross National 
Product) to total DAC over the eleven years from 1996 to 2006.  
Greece contributes the lowest amount of development aid as a percentage of GNP of the 
three countries for all but the first year of this period. Greece’s contribution is well below the 
average for the DAC. Portugal’s contributions were around the DAC average for the middle 
section of this period, increasing in 2003/4 before falling abruptly to below the DAC average 
in 2005. Luxembourg’s contribution started well above the DAC average in this period, and 
has increased its lead to well over twice total DAC. The DAC average itself, while growing 
slowly, remains below the EU target of 0.51% by 2010. 
 















OECD.Stat DAC3a, 2008,  World Bank, 2008, World Development Indicators, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ accessed 22/6/08 
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4.  Analytical approach 
 
Two key issues arise when exploring aid allocation criteria. First, there is the  matter of 
specification: which motives should be explored empirically? Second, there is the issue of the 
appropriate estimator to use. We address both issues in this section.  
 
4.1  Aid allocation variables 
As noted earlier, researchers have explored several allocation criteria. We group these into 
three broad categories. 
 
(1)  Recipient needs: Humanitarian concerns are the stated objective of development aid: 
aid is given to poor countries to assist with poverty reduction and with economic and social 
development. Hence, we should expect to find a negative association between aid and per 
capita income. Non-linear effects are often included also in empirical investigations. Country 
size as measured by country population is also an important factor in this. In this paper we 
also consider life expectancy and economic growth as other indicators of need.  
 
(2)  Donor  commercial  interests: Donors may be motivated by their own commercial 
interests and seek to allocate funds to countries that will facilitate trade. While this is a self 
interested basis upon which to allocate aid, it need not be detrimental to development. For 
example, significant gains from trade arise as a result of selfish motives, as both parties can 
gain from voluntary exchange.
4
 
  Measures of commercial interests include exports to the 
recipient country, imports from the recipient country, foreign direct investment and debt 
levels with the country. In this paper, we present the results of using export shares to proxy 
for commercial interests.  
(3)  Political  economy  considerations:  Several politically motivated factors can be 
identified. First, there are political ties: Countries have historical ties with each other. For 
example, there may be former colonial ties, or cultural and religious ties between countries. 
There may also exist neighborhood effects, where nations feel a natural affinity with the 
plight of their nearest neighbors.   Second, there might exist significant 
inertia/incrementalism: Aid is distributed over time, so that there may be a significant 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, to the extent that aid allocations distort trade decisions – inducing developing countries to 
engage in trade that they would otherwise not have undertaken on the basis of comparative advantage – the 
gains from trade would be truncated.   12 
autoregressive component in the allocation of aid. Part of this is related to the nature of aid 
projects. Part of it, however, arises from the nature of the bureaucracies that are in charge of 
the aid allocations: Bureaucracies might find it simpler to allocate aid in the current year on 
the same basis as it was allocated last year. Empirically, this effect can be captured with a 
lagged dependent variable. A third factor is the bandwagon effect: Donors may allocate aid 
simply by following what other donors are doing. This makes the allocation of aid easier, as 
well as less risky. It also wins points for the donor, as it conforms to the actions of other 
(usually more important donors). Bandwagon effects have the effect of reinforcing the 
humanitarian, commercial, and political objectives of the main donors. This effect is captured 
by including the total DAC commitments less the commitments from the donor under 
investigation. 
 
In addition to these factors, there is also the issue of good behavior: aid may be given to 
countries that are behaving in a manner that is deemed to be desirable from the donor’s point 
of view. A key factor here is the level of political freedom in the recipient country.  In 
empirical research, this is usually measured by the Gastil index of political freedom. Another 
measure of good behavior is policy, typically defined as an index of budget balance, inflation 
rate, and trade openness.    A third measure is the extent of corruption. Another popular 
indicator is the Freedom House measure of economic freedom, which might be considered as 
a much broader measure than ‘good policy’. However, due to a very large number of gaps in 
the data, we do not consider any of these good behavior models in our analysis: We want to 
analyze as the aid allocations to as large number of recipients as possible. 
 
 4.2  Econometric model 
The donor motives listed above are not all necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, there 
is some degree of overlap between commercial interests and political economy factors. 
Following prior research, our approach in this paper is to estimate a general model that nests 
both donor needs and recipient interests within the one model. That is, it is possible for 
several motives to exist simultaneously. Our approach is to explore both different 
combinations of motives, as well as all motives concurrently. That is, we estimate both 
general and specific aid allocation models, though we present the results of only the more 
general models. 
  We estimate three models that are commonly found in the literature. First, we 
combine all the above allocation criteria, and estimate versions of the following double-log    13 
 
generic aid allocation equation: 
 
it t i 1 it 5 1 it 4 1 it 3 1 it 2 1 it 1 it v u Trade ln GDPPC ln Pop ln DAC ln Aid ln Aid ln + + + + + + + = − − − − − γ β β β β β  (1) 
 
where ln denotes the natural log, i and t index the i
th recipient at time period t, Aid is ODA, 
DAC is the value of total DAC ODA to recipient less ODA from the donor, Pop is country 
size measured by population, GDPPC is per capita real GDP, and Trade is a measure of 
commercial activity between the donor and the recipient. In our case we use the share of 
donor exports to the recipient. The error components include a standard random error term, 
vit, as well as the country specific effects ui and the period specific effects γt. The coefficient 
β1 measures the size of the inertia or incrementalism effect, the coefficient β2 measures the 
bandwagon effect, while β3 and β4 measure the effects of country size and humanitarian need 
respectively, and β5 measures donor interests. Equation 1 is estimated using two-way fixed 
effects, allowing for both recipient country specific effects and time specific effects. The 
country fixed effects are included to capture unobserved preferences that are country specific, 
while the period fixed effects capture any time specific effects, or unobserved preferences 
that are specific to years. Equation 1 is estimated separately for each donor. 
  The log-log nature of equation 1 excludes all zero allocations.  This means that it 
excludes non-recipients from the sample. This is potentially limiting, as zero allocations 
might be informative with respect to donor motives. Hence, our second model makes use of 
the limited dependent variable nature of the aid allocation data, and uses the Tobit random 
effects model.
5
  In order to reduce sample bias, we include all the countries for which each of the new 
donors has contributed aid. This means that the sample contains a number of years with zero 
aid allocations. These arise because aid might be given to a recipient in one year but not the 
 Following convention, we call this Tobit I. Our third model is the popular 
two-step procedure. That is, we first estimate a probit model to capture the decision as to 
which countries to donate to, and then the second decision on the amounts to allocate to each 
country (see McGillivray 2003). Again following convention, we call this Tobit II.  The key 
and important difference between the two Tobit models and equation 1 is that the later 
measures aid in natural logarithms, while the second measures it in absolute amounts, 
enabling zero allocations to be included in the estimation. 
                                                 
5 The estimation of Tobit Fixed Effects model is problematic and hence we focus on Tobit Random Effects.   14 
next, or aid might be given to a recipient at some point in time, but not from the 
commencement of donation, or aid might not be given at all by donor i, but is given by donor 
j. 
   
The Tobit I model is given by: 
 
it t i 1 it 5 1 it 4 1 it 3 1 it 2 1 it 1
*




it Aid is a latent variable such that 
*
it it Aid Aid =  if  0 Aid
*
it > , and  0 Aidit = if  0 Aid
*
it < . 
That is, 
*
it Aid is observed only for aid values greater than 0. 
  The Tobit II model involves a two-stage process. Stage 1 involves identifying which 
developing countries will receive ODA from the donor. Once these countries are identified, 
the amount of aid to be donated is determined in stage 2. Stage 1 normally involves the 
estimation of a probit model. Here we use the random effects probit model.
6
 
 From this, we 
can calculate the inverse Mills ratio, which then enters into the second stage of  the 
estimation. 
5.  Data 
Data on bilateral aid commitments for Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal were obtained 
from the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation’s statistical site, 
OECD.Stat. The data were gathered from the DAC, Table 3a, “Total ODA Commitments”. A 
commitment is defined as “a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, 
backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds. Commitments are 
considered to be made at the date a loan or grant agreement is signed or the obligation is 
otherwise made known to the recipient.” (OECD DAC 2008). Total commitments include 
grants, capital subscriptions, total net loans, and other long-term capital. To be counted as 
ODA, the donor’s main intention must be to promote the economic development and welfare 
of recipients. It must contain a grant element of at least 25% (OECD DAC, 2002). The data 
are expressed in constant US dollars. The data for total commitments for all DAC countries 
were also obtained from this source. 
                                                 
6 Note that identification requires at least one more variable that is distinct in the first-stage analysis. We use the 
total ODA budget to serve this role (see Tarp et al. 1999).    15 
Data on the population of the recipient countries (in thousands) were collected from 
the DAC, as were data on merchandise exports to the recipient countries, and merchandise 
imports received by donors from the recipient countries. Merchandise trade figures  were 
collected in current US dollars and then deflated using DAC deflators. Data on Real GDP of 
recipient countries were obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators and  are 
expressed in constant 2000 US dollars.  
 
6.  Results for new donors 
The results of estimating equation 1 are presented in Table 5. Column 1 presents the results 
for Greece. Column 2a presents the results for Luxembourg without the export shares 
variable, while column 2b presents the results with export shares. Two sets of results are 
presented for Luxembourg, because the trade figures are unavailable for Luxembourg prior to 
1999.
7
  The lagged aid variable is statistically significant for all countries, indicating the 
importance of incrementalism and/or inertia in aid allocation decisions. The results from 
column 2a suggest that the size of the effect is greatest for Luxembourg. However, this does 
not hold when the export share variable is introduced  and the shorter time period used. 
Greece has the largest bandwagon effect: A 10% increase in non-Greek DAC aid to the ith 
recipient, results in a 2.3% increase in Greek ODA to that recipient. In sharp contrast, there 
would be no response from Portugal.  
 The results for Portugal are presented in column 3. 
  Interestingly, humanitarian  concerns, as measured by per capita income are not 
important for any of the three donors.  Population size is important only for Luxembourg. 
  Commercial interests, as measured by export shares, appear to be unimportant to 
Greece, and the statistical significance of this variable for Portugal is very low. Column 2 
suggests that exports are a key factor for aid allocations for Luxembourg (though this is not 
for the entire period over which Luxembourg has been a donor). 
  We conclude from Table 5 that motives differ across this group of donors. Both 
bandwagon effects and humanitarian concerns are unimportant for Portugal. Greek aid is 
driven by incrementalism and bandwagon effects. Commercial interests appear to be 
unimportant for both countries. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Prior to 1999, trade data for Luxembourg were grouped with those of Belgium.   16 
 
 
Table 5: Aid Allocation Criteria, New Donors, Two-Way Fixed Effects 











Recipient needs          
ln Populationt-1  1.39 (0.86)  2.96 (2.84)  3.55 (1.47)  -0.96 (-0.59) 




       
Share of exports t-1  3.26 (0.91)  -  1.04 (2.69)  0.26 (1.67) 
 
Political economy  
       
ln Lagged aid  0.20 (2.55)  0.33 (3.61)  0.07 (0.72)  0.14 (3.31) 
ln DAC aid t-1  0.23 (4.28)  0.17 (2.47)  -0.02 (-0.16)  0.05 (0.33) 
Time period  1996 – 2006  1991 - 2006  1999-2006  1989- 2006 
K  106  87  77  73 
N  604  767  330  312 
SER  0.91  0.89  0.75  0.87 
Adjusted R
2  0.78  0.68  0.78  1.01 
All estimates are based on two-way fixed effects model. Figures in bold are statistically significant at least at the 
10% level. K is the number of countries. N is the number of observations. Replacing the share of exports with 
either the share of imports or the trade balance does not change the results markedly. t-statistics using robust 
standard errors reported in brackets. 
 
 
  The dependent variable in Table 5 is expressed in logarithms. This results in the loss 
of a large number of observations. Zero aid allocations can also be informative, but this 
information is lost when a logarithmic transformation is used  as the dependent variable. 
Accordingly,  Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the results when the actual dollar value of aid 
allocations is used, comparing results from OLS to the Tobit regression models, for Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal, respectively.  
  The results differ markedly between tables 5 and 6. We compare first the OLS results 
from tables 5 and 6, and then compare the OLS to the Tobit regressions reported in Table 6. 
In the case of Greece (Table 6), only the bandwagon effect remains as a motive, once the 
actual aid allocations are used as the dependent variable. Unfortunately, the OLS results 
reported in Table 6 ignore the truncation of many observations: a large proportion of 
observations are censored at zero. The Tobit regressions incorporate this characteristic. 
Column 2 reports the results from the Tobit Random Effects model using the same variables 
as Table 5. Column 3 reports the results of adding two additional variables. Neighbor is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 for countries that are neighbors to Greece and 0 
otherwise. EastEurope is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for countries that are either   17 
European countries (e.g. Malta) or belong to transitional economies (such as Albania, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, etc). The inclusion of these two variables makes two important differences 
to the results.
8
  The results for Luxembourg are presented in Table 7. Our preferred set of results is 
presented in column 3, using the Tobit II RW  model with time dummies. 
Incrementalism/inertia emerges as an important factor in Luxembourg’s aid allocations, 
always having a positive sign, which interestingly is close to 1 in column 3. The results for 
the other variables are not robust. Population, income per capita, and export shares all change 
sign once the EastEurope dummy is included, and a two step estimation approach is adopted. 
The log-likelihood ratio test suggests that the results presented in column 3 are preferred to 
those reported in column 2. Population has a negative coefficient, while per capita income 
has a positive one. Taken together, these two variables indicate that Luxembourg donates to 
the more developed and least populated nations. Luxembourg might prefer to donate to more 
developed countries as these countries will tend to generate projects that are more likely to 
succeed. Aid from Luxembourg would be more noticeable, and buy more reputation and 
political mileage, in a smaller country, hence the negative coefficient on population. The size 
of the coefficient on income per capita, of course, does not seem plausible. Interestingly, the 
coefficient on East Europe is negative. This means that Luxembourg donates less to East 
European transitional economies. This is consistent with the results for per capita income and 
population. It suggests that Luxembourg prefers to donate funds to more developed non-
European nations.  
 First, the Tobit RE II model emerges as superior to the Tobit RE I model. 
Hence,  we  report  the  latter,  which  includes  λ  as  an  argument.  Second,  once these two 
variables are added, all the time dummies become statistically insignificant. Hence, we re-
estimate the model without time dummies. Our preferred set of results is presented in Column 
4, using the Tobit RE II model. Interestingly, commercial interests and the DAC variable are 
no longer statistically significant. We conclude that in the case of Greece, the key drivers for 
donating aid are whether a country is a neighbor and whether the recipient belongs to the 
transitional group of European countries. Many of Greece’s neighbor’s are relatively poor, 
and in that sense Greek aid to these countries might be considered to be driven by 
humanitarian concerns.  However, the model controls for per capita income, thus the results 
suggest that the motives for granting aid to neighbors are not humanitarian. Greece appears to 
donate to its neighbors for political interests and security concerns.  
                                                 
8 Note that because Table 5 uses fixed rather than random effects, the variables Neighbor and EastEurope 
cannot be included in the analysis presented in that table.   18 
For Portugal, the preferred set of results is presented in Table 8, column 4, using the 
Tobit RE I model without time dummies. Commercial interests are important to Portugal’s 
aid allocations. The higher the share of exports, the larger is the amount of aid committed. 
The other important factors are an inverse association with DAC donations and a positive 
association with former colonies. Portugal does not follow DAC allocations, indeed, she 
tends to allocate less to those countries that receive more DAC funding. The one exception is 
countries that were former colonies. These receive significant amount of aid. Evidently, prior 
colonial status, and commercial interests, drive Portugal’s aid allocation. 
   19 
 
Table 6: Greece, OLS, Random Effects Tobit and Two-Part Estimation procedures 



















       
Populationt-1 
(million)  0.002 (0.46)  0.0002 (0.32)  0.0010 (-0.32)  -0.0005 (-0.16) 
Income per 





       
Share of 




       
Lagged aid  -0.17 (-1.17)  -0.035 (-0.93)  -0.051(-1.36)  -0.051(-1.36) 
DAC aid t-1  0.0004 (1.71)  0.0006 (1.77)  0.0004 (1.00)  0.0004 (1.02) 
Neighbor  -  -  9.018 (4.15)  9.340 (4.49) 
EastEurope  -  -  3.028 (2.14)  3.313 (2.67) 
λ  -  -  -4.173 (-3.82)  -3.790 (-6.15) 
Time 
Dummies  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Time period  1996 – 2006  1996 – 2006  1996 – 2006  1996 – 2006 
K  147  147  147  147 
N  1,433  1,433  1,433  1,433 
SER  3.21  -  -  - 
Adjusted R
2  0.56  -  -  - 
Log likelihood  -3619.03  -2585.54  -2547.44  -2551.55 
LR test  -  -  14.96  39.49 [0.00] 
No. censored 








-  4.48  4.44  4.47 
Wald time 
dummies  11.96 [0.21]  30.51 [0.00]  8.31 [0.50]  - 
Wald test 
(prob-value)  12.54 [0.00]  55.73 [0.00]  143.91 [0.00]  136.46 [0.00] 
Column 1 reports Two-Way Fixed Effects, while columns 2 to 4 report the random-effects Tobit regression 
model. Tobit RE II denotes estimates associated with a two-part estimation procedure, involving a random-
effects probit regression at stage one, and then the random-effects Tobit model in stage two. Figures in bold are 
statistically significant, at least at the 10% level. K is the number of countries. N is the number of observations. 
λ  is the inverse Mills ratio (the hazard). The  Wald time dummies  provide a test for the joint statistical 
significance of the time effects. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of all variables 
included in the model.   20 
Table 7: Luxembourg, OLS, Random Effects Tobit and Two-Part Estimation 
procedures 






Tobit RE I 
(2) 
Luxembourg 




     
Populationt-1 
(million)  -0.005 (-0.58)  0.0015 (3.43)  -0.0007 (-1.90) 
Income per 





     
Share of 




     
Lagged aid  0.28 (2.79)  0.668 (14.67)  0. 911 (37.42) 
DAC aid t-1  -0.0001 (-0.88)  -0.0001 (-0.46)  -0.0001 (-0.92) 
EastEurope  -  -  -0.398 (-2.75) 
λ  -  -  -1.358 (-7.53) 
Time dummies  YES  YES  YES 






K  147  147  147 
N  1,005  1,005  1,005 
SER  0.70  -  - 
Adjusted R
2  0.91  -  - 
Log likelihood  -  -1028.30  -590.80 
LR test  -  -  769.45 [0.00] 
No. censored 








-  1.06  1.21 
Wald time 
dummies  6.90 [0.33]  10.12 [0.12]   11.84 [0.07] 
Wald test 
(prob-value)  66.34 [0.00]  353.06 [0.00]  3519.09 [0.00] 
Column 1 reports Two-Way Fixed Effects, while columns 2 to 4 report the random-effects Tobit regression 
model. Tobit RE II denotes estimates associated with a two-part estimation procedure, involving a random-
effects probit regression at stage one, and then the random-effects Tobit model in stage two. Figures in bold are 
statistically significant, at least at the 10% level. K is the number of countries. N is the number of observations. 
λ  is the inverse  Mills ratio (the hazard). The  Wald time dummies  provide a test for the joint statistical 
significance of the time effects. The Wald test provides a test for the joint statistical significance of all variables 
included in the model.   21 
Table 8: Portugal, OLS, Random Effects Tobit and Two-Part Estimation procedures 



















       
Populationt-1 
(million)  -0.001 (-0.11)  -0.0001  (-0.37)  -0.004  (-0.57)  -0.004  (-0.87) 
Income per 





     
 
Share of 




     
 
Lagged aid  0.008 (0.09)  0.130 (6.59)  0.032 (0.78)  0.033 (1.50) 
DAC aid t-1  -0.001  (-0.58)  0.001  (0.78)  -0.008 (-4.98)  -0.008  (-7.24) 
EastEurope  -  -  -0.856  (-0.47)  -0.847  (-0.47) 
Former colony  -  -  13.733 (3.77)  13.874 (5.59) 
Time 
Dummies  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Time period  1990-2006  1990-2006  1990-2006  1990-2006 
K  147  147  147  147 
N  2,355  2,355  2,355  2,355 
SER  15.73  -  -  - 
Adjusted R
2  0.25  -  -  - 
Log likelihood  -9744.16  -3743.90  -3848.04  -3850.20 
LR test  -  -  -  - 
No. censored 









-  15.65  15.41 
15.47 
Wald time 
dummies  -  8.48 [0.93]  8.92 [0.92]  - 
Wald test 
(prob-value)    733.40 [0.00]  290.49 [0.00]  283.20 [0.00] 
Column 1 reports Two-Way Fixed Effects, while columns 2 to 4 report the random-effects Tobit regression 
model. Tobit RE II denotes estimates associated with a two-part estimation procedure, involving a random-
effects probit regression at stage one, and then the random-effects Tobit model in stage two. Figures in bold are 
statistically significant, at least at the 10% level. K is the number of countries. N is the number of observations. 
The Wald time dummies provide a test for the joint statistical significance of the time effects. The Wald test 
provides a test for the joint statistical significance of all variables included in the model.   22 
It is pertinent to compare the motives of the new donors to the more established donors. 
On the one hand, we expect that new donors will be more effective at making aid work, as 
they have the experience of the established donors to draw upon. On the other hand, if 
established donors are successful in allocating aid to poverty reduction, that might free up 
new donors to pursue other motives.  
We do not present regressions for the established donors. However, we do draw upon 
previews reviews of the evidence. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2007) apply meta-analysis to 
124 empirical studies and establish a negative coefficient on income. While the effect is 
small, it is robust. Our own primary data analysis thus stands in sharp contrast to the evidence 
for established donors. While humanitarian concerns might play a small role in the aid 
allocation decisions of established donors, it plays no role at all in the allocations of new 
donors. This finding is of some concern as it runs counter to wishes of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration. 
 
7.  Robustness  
Several robustness tests were conducted. First, we transformed the data from annual flows to 
five-year averages. Five-year averages will smooth away any year-to-year fluctuations and 
might reveal long-term associations. They do, however, come at a cost of losing detailed 
information, and result in a much smaller number of observations. Second, we used 
alternative indicators of humanitarian need. We replaced, sequentially, per capita income 
with: economic growth, life expectancy, and infant mortality.
9
                                                 
9 The data for these alternative measures of humanitarian need come from the World Development Indicators. In 
all cases, the use of these measures results in a smaller number of observations. 
  Third, we truncated the data 
further. The logic for doing this is that it might be the case that small aid allocations are 
largely a random process. For example, small amounts might be given in response to 
emergency relief, or they might be allocated on criteria that are not reflected by the main 
humanitarian, commercial and strategic interests. To test for this effect, we transformed into 
zero any aid allocation that was less than 0.1% of the donor’s annual aid budget: we 
considered also 0.5% as the  cutoff point. This  artificial truncation converts smaller aid 
allocations into zero and leaves larger aid allocations, that might be more strategically and 
policy driven. These results are summarized in table 9. None of these robustness tests alter 




 This is the one instance where humanitarian needs emerge as an important motive for 
aid allocation. 
Table 9: Robustness Tests,  




of recipient needs,  
Greece 
Alternative measures 
of recipient needs,  
Luxembourg 
Alternative measures 
of recipient needs,  
Portugal 
Income per capita  -0.0001  (-1.06)  127.29 (1.81)*  -5.601  (-0.18) 
 
Income per capita, 
5-year average 
-0.0001 (-1.38)  0.0001 (0.53)  -0.0010 (-5.79)*** 
 
Economic growth  2.875 (0.86)  -1.4789 (-1.62)  -2.5202 (-0.36) 
 
Life expectancy  0.0086  (0.39)  -0.0029 (-0.44)  -0.11706 (-0.98) 
 
Infant Mortality  0.0001  (0.02)  0.0017 (0.92) 
  -0.0001 (0.01) 
 
Income per capita, 
truncation of 
sample, at 0.1% 
0.0004 (1.71)*  94.83 (0.53)  -5.5581 (-0.18) 
 
Income per capita, 
truncation of 
sample, at 0.5% 
-0.0001  (-0.21)  823.99 (3.16)***  -5.5074 (-0.17) 
Notes:  Each cell reports the coefficient on humanitarian need from separate regressions. For 
comparison purposes, the first row reproduces the key result from Tables 6, 7 and 8. 
Sample sizes vary depending on the measure of humanitarian need used.  
 
 
8.  Summary 
Development aid assistance is an important billion dollar global industry. More 
importantly, it is seen by many to be a critical mechanism for economic development and 
alleviating the plight of the third world. Donors, and citizens from donor countries, want to 
see global poverty reduced. While much attention has been devoted to the motives of 
established donors, particularly France, the US, Scandinavia and the UK, little is known 
about new and emerging donors. This paper offers an initial exploration into the motives of 
three donors, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal.  
The results show a diversity of motives. Greece allocates aid to her neighbors, as well as 
to transitional East European economies: other countries certainly do receive aid but these 
allocations appear to be random.  Luxembourg tends to allocate development aid to smaller 
                                                 
10 Note that the other results for Portugal remain, particularly former colony status.   24 
developing nations and those that are relatively more developed. Commercial interests are 
important for both Luxembourg and for Portugal. Portugal also gives more aid to her former 
colonies.  The aid allocation from all three countries does, however, share one common 
feature: None of them give more aid to poorer countries. That is, over the period studied, 
humanitarian concerns are not a significant feature of aid giving. This finding is robust to the 
measurement of the dependent variable (be it in logarithms or actual dollar allocations) and is 
robust to estimation (be it OLS  or censored regressions). This aspect deserves further 
research. Why are the new donors not allocating aid on the basis of humanitarian needs? Are 
the newer non-DAC donors also motivated by non-humanitarian concerns? How might aid 
allocations be reoriented towards poverty alleviation? 
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